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ABSTRACT
Three models of price and wage behavior are estimated and tested
in this paper. Model 1 is one in which the long—run trade—off between unem-
ployment and inflation is in terms of price levels; Model 2 is one in which
the trade—off is in terms of rates of change; and Model 3 is one in which
there is no long—run trade—off. The evidence favors Model 1 over Models 2
and 3. The comparison between Models 2 and 3 is inconclusive. The short—run
trade—offs are greater for Model 1 than for Models 2 and 3. The fact that
Model 3 did not do particularly well is evidence against the Friedman—Phelps
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An important question in macroeconomics is the size of the trade-
off between unemployment and inflation.I have been asked by the organ-
izers of this symposium to consider this question, and so this is yet
another paper on the trade-off issue. Given an econometric model of price
and wage behavior, it is straightforward to compute the trade-off, The
key problem is finding the model that best approximates the unknown struc-
ture, and this problem is the focus of this paper.
Three models of price and wage behavior are considered. The first,
Model 1, is the one contained in my macroeconometric model of the United
States (Fair (1984)). The second, Model 2, is one that is closer to what
might he considered the standard" model in the literature. The third, Model
3, is one in which there is no long-run trade-off between unemployment
inflation. Model 3 is Model 2 with a certain restriction on the coeffi-
cients,
The paper is organized as follows. Some methodological issues are
discussed in Section II. The models are presented and estimated in Sec-
tion III and tested in Section IV. The unemployment-inflation trade-offs
*For presentation at "Price Stability and Public Policy," a symposium spon-
sored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming,
August 1-3, 1984.
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implied by each model are presented in Section V. Section VI contains
a general evaluation of the results and a discussion of their consequences
for macroeconomic policy and research.
II. Some Methodology
It will be useful to present a few of my views about macroeconomic
research before launching into the specification of the equations. The
first issue concerns how much information one expects to get out of macro
time series data. Consider, for example, the question of which demand
variable to use in a price or wage equation. My experience is that macro
data are not capable of discriminating among many different measures of
demand. Similar results are obtained using such variables as the overall
unemployment rate, the unemployment rate of married men, various weighted
unemployment rates, various output gaps, and various nonlinear functions
of these variables.1 It is also difficult to discriminate among alterna-
tive lag distributions for the explanatory variables, a point made by
Griliches (1968) many years ago and one that still seems valid.
If one feels, as I do, that macro data contain a fairly limited
amount of information, the obvious procedure to follow in econometric work
is to keep the specifications simple. If the data cannot discriminate
among alternative detailed specifications, there is no sense in making
detailed specifications in the first place. One should also avoid making
strong inferences from results that are sensitive to alternative specifi-
cations that the data may not be able to discriminate among. This is an
obvious point, but it is perhaps worth emphasizing. In particular, note
'See, for example, the discussion in Fair (1978), pp. 176-180, and in Fair
(1984), pp. 128-129.that oneshouldbe wary about making strong conclusions regarding the
validityof a model's long-run properties. This is because long-run prop-
erties are likely to be sensitive to alternative lag distributions, which
are in turn likely to be difficult to discriminate among.
The approach of keeping macro specifications fairly simple is at
odds with the approach of Robert Gordon and George Perry, two of the lead-
ing figures in the field of price and wage behavior. Gordon's specifica-
tions are characterized by the use of high order polynomial distributed lags with
long lag lengths, the use of detailed dummy variables, and considerable
work in the construction of many of the explanatory variables. One reason
that Gordon's specifications change so much from year to year is probably
that they are too detailed to be supported by the data. New data seem
to imply a change in specification when in fact no specification for a
'2
givenyear is really supported.Perry's specifications are also usually
somewhat involved, especially with respect to the choice of the demand
variable and the use of dummy variables.3 It will be clear in what fol-
lows that myspecificationsare simpler than those of Gordon and Perry,
and one should keep in mind my reason for this difference.
Another view I have about macroeconomic research is that there have
been too few attempts to test one model against another. One reason there
is currently so much disagreement in macroeconomics is probably that there
minor but illustrative example of Gordon's changing specifications con-
cerns the use of dummy variables for the Nixon control period. In Gordon
(1980) one dummy variable is used, which is .67 for 1971 III -1972IV,
-1.0for 1974 II -1975I,and 0.0 otherwise. In Gordon and King (1982)
two variables are used. One is .8 for 1971 III -1972II and 0.0 other-
wise; and the other is .4 for 1974 II and 1975 I, 1.6 for 1974 III and
1974 IV, and 0.0 otherwise.
See, for example, the specifications in Perry (1980).4
has been so little testing of alternative specifications.I developed
a few years ago a method for testing alternative models (Fair (1980)),
and this is the method that I have used in this paper to compare the three
models of price and wage behavior. One of the premises upon which this
method is based is that all models are at least somewhat misspecified.
An important feature of the method is that it accounts for the effects
of misspecification in making the comparisons across models.
III. The Three Models
Model 1
Model 1 is the model of price and wage behavior in my U.S. model.
The following is a brief discussion of it. A more complete discussion is
contained in Fair (1984). Firms in the theoretical model are assumed to
set prices and wages in a profit-maximizing context. They have some monop-
oly power in the short run in their price and wage setting behavior.
Raising their prices above prices charged by other firms does not result
in an immediate loss of all their customers, and lowering their prices
below prices charged by other firms does not result in an immediate gain
of everyone else's customers. There is, however, a tendency for high-price
firms to lose customers over time and for low-price firms to gain customers.
Similar statements hold for wages. Firms expect that the future prices
and wages of other firms are in part a function of their own past prices
and wages. Since a firm's market share is a function of its price rela-
tive to the prices of other firms, its optimal price strategy depends on
this relationship. Expectations of firms are in some cases determined in
fairly sophisticated ways, but none of the expectations are rational in the
Muth sense. Firms do not know the complete model, and their expectations5
can turn out to be incorrect.
There are five main decision variables of a firm in the theoretical
model. In addition to the firm's price level and wage rate, the variahies
are the firm's production, investment, and demand for employment. These
decision variables are determined by solving a multiperiod maximization
problem. The predetermined variables that affect the solution to this
problem include (1) the initial stocks of excess capital, excess labor,
and inventories, (2) the current and expected future values of the inter-
est rate, (3) the current and expected future demand schedules for the
firm's output, (4) the current and expected future supply schedules of
labor facing the firm, and (5) expectations of other firms' future price
and wage decisions.
The transition in macroeconomics from theoretical models to econo-
metric specifications is usually difficult, and the present case is no
exception. The aim of the econometric work is to try to approximate the
decision equations of the firms that result from the solutions of the maxi-
mization problems. The empirical work for the price and wage equations
consisted of trying the variables listed above, directly or indirectly,
as explanatory variables. Observed variables were used directly, and un-
observed variables were used indirectly by trying observed variables that
seemed likely to affect the unobserved variables. The main unobserved
variables are expectations.
I will not review here the work that led to the final estimated
equations. This is discussed in Fair (1984), pp. 126-131. The final
estimated equations are presented in Table 1. The equations are in log
form. The explanatory variables in the price equation include the price
level lagged once, the wage rate inclusive of employer social securityTABLE 1
The price and wage models
Sample period is 1954 I -1984I (121 observations)
Explanatory Variables
Model 1
log Pt const. log P_ log W(l+dt) log PIMt URt_i
SE 0W
2SLS .159 .937 .0268 .0335 -.205 .00377 1.75
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Models 2 and 3
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log W -log-l const. log P_1 -logPt URt
Model 2: 2SLS .0142 .175 —.114 .00565 1.96
.
(7.48) (8.69) (3.27)












Notes: t-statistics in absolute value are in parentheses.
acoefficient constraint (4) in text imposed on the equations.
bCoefficient constraint (1O)In text imposed on the equations.
OLS =ordinaryleast squares
2SLS =twostage least squares
3SLS =threestage least squares
First stage regressors:
A =secondbasic set of variables in Fair (1984), Table 6-1, p. 228.
Model 1, 2SLS, log eq.: A minus ZZtl plus 1og(1+d). (ZZ is a demand pressure variable.)
Model 1, 2SLS, log W eq.: A plus log PX1. (PX is a price deflator.)
Model 1, 3SLS :A plus log(l+d) plus log PX_1.
Model 2, 2SLS : A plus log PX1 plus log - log
Models2 and 3, 3SLS :A plus log(l+d) plus log PX1 plus log -1 -log—s plus log PIMt1
—logPIMtplus log W i(l+d l -logWts(l+d15) plus log P_1 —log—2
VariableNotation in Fair (1984) Description
d d5g +d55 Employer social security tax rate
Pf Price deflator for private nonfarm output
PIMt PIM Price deflator for imports
URt
UR Civilian unemployment rate





taxes, the price of imports, and the unemployment rate lagged once. The
unemployment rate is taken to be a proxy for the current and expected
future demand schedules for the firms' output. For the work in Fair (1984)
an alternative measure of demand was used, which was a measure of the real
output gap. As noted in Section II, a variety of demand variables work
about equally well. The unemployment rate was used in this paper in order
to make the trade-off calculations in Section V somewhat simpler. The
other three variables in the price equation are taken to be proxies for
expectations of other firms' price decisions. Increases in the lagged
price level, the wage rate, and the price of imports are assumed to lead
to expectations of future price increases, which in the theoretical model
lead to an increase in current prices.
The explanatory variables in the wage equation include the wage
lagged once, the current price level, the price level lagged once, a time
trend, and the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is taken to be a
proxy for the current and expected future supply schedules of labor facing
the firms. The lagged wage variable and the current and lagged price var-
iables are taken to be proxies for expectations of other firms' wage de-
cisions. Increases in these variables are assumed to lead to expectations
of future wage increases, which in the theoretical model lead to an increase
in current wages. The time trend was added to account for trend changes
in the wage rate relative to the price level. The inclusion of the time
trend is importallt, since it helps identify the price equation. Aside
from the different lags for the unemployment rate, the time trend and the
lagged wage rate are the only two variables not included in the price equa-
tion that are included in the wage equation.4
4There is one slight difference between thewage equation here and the8
Before discussing the estimates, a constraint that was imposed on
the real wage rate needs to be explained. It does not seem sensible for
thereal wage rate (W/P)tobe a function of either 1V or Pt sep-
arately, and in order to ensure that this not be true, a constraint on the
coefficientsof the price and wage equations must be imposed. The relevant
parts of the two equations are
(1) log =llog I-1 +2logW +
(2) log W =llogW1 +2log Pt +y3log t-l +
Fromthese two equations, the equation for the real wage is





Inorder for the real wage not to be a function of the wage and price levels,
the coefficient of log W in (3) must equal the negative of the coeffi-
cient of log t-l This requires that
(4) = +y3) (1-
—i(1
—
Threesets of estimates of Model 1 are presented in Table 1. The
estimation technique for the first set is two stage least squares (2SLS),
and the estimation technique for the second and third sets is three stage
one in Fair (1984). The same price deflator is used in both equations here
(the private nonfarm deflator), whereas a different price deflator is used
in the wage equation in Fair (1984) (the private deflator, both farm and
nonfarm). This difference is not important inthesense that the data can-
not discriminate between the two, and the simpler snecification was used
here for ease of interpretation.9
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least squares (.SLS).The restriction (4) is imposed for the third set,
but not for the first and second. The endogenous variables in the price
equation are log Pt and log W ,andthe endogenous variables in the
wage equation are log W ,logPt ,andURt URt is taken to be
an endogenous variable even though no equation is specified for it in this
paper. It is an endogenous variable in my U.S. model. The first stage
regressors that were used for the estimates are discussed in the notes to
Table 1. The basic set of variables referred to in the notes consists of
34 variables. These are the main predetermined variables in my U.S. model.
The 2SLS estimated residuals were used for the estimation of the covariance
matrix of the error terms that is needed for the 3SLS estimates. The cor-
relation coefficient for the error terms in the two equations was -.299.
The data base used in Fair (1984) was updated through 1984 I for
the results in this paper. The estimation period for all the equations
in Table 1. is 1954 I -1984I, which is a total of 121 observations.
The three sets of estimates of Model 1 are quite close, and there
is little to choose among them. The coefficient restriction (4) is clearly
supported by the data. The value of the 3SLS objective function was -96.471
for the unrestricted estimates and -96.567 for the restricted estimates,
for a difference of only .096. This difference is asymntotically distri-
buted as with one degree of freedom, and the .096 value is far below
the critical x2 value at the 95 percent confidence level of 3.84.
Model 1 differs from traditional models of wage and price behavior
in a number of ways, and it will be useful to discuss two of these differences.
5All calculations for this paper except for those in Section V were done
using the Fair-Parke program. The Park (1982) algorithm was used to com-
pute the 3SLS estimates.10
First, most price and wage equations are specified in terms of rates of
change of prices and wages rather than in terms of levels. Given the
theory behind Model 1, the natural decision variables seemed to be the
levels of prices and wages rather than the rates of change, and so this
was the specification used. For example, the market share equations in
the theoretical model have a firm's market share as a function of the ratio
of the firm's price to the average price of other firms. These prices
are all price levels, and the objective of the firm is to choose the price
level path (along with the paths of the other decision variables) that
maximizes the multiperiod objective function. A firm decides what its
price level should be relative to the price levels of other firms. The
use of levels instead of rates of change has important consequences for
the long-run properties of the model. This is discussed in Sections V
and VI.
Second, most price equations are postulated to be mark up equations,
where little or no demand effects are expected. Wage equations are postu-
lated to be the ones where demand effects are most likely to exist. Model
1 is to some extent the reverse of this. The unemployment rate has a
larger coefficient estimate (in absolute value) and is more significant
in the price equation than in the wage equation. Also, the coefficient
estimate of the wage rate in the price equation is too small to be inter-
preted as a mark up coefficient. The theory behind the price and wage
equations is not a mark up theory, and so there is no reason to expect the
estimated equations to have properties of mark up equations. The equations
do not appear to have such properties.11
v1odel 2
As just noted, price and wage equations are typically specified
in terms of rates of change of prices and wages rather than in terms of
levels, and price equations are typically specified to be mark up equations.
This specification has been used for Model 2.I tried a number of equa-
tions that seemed consistent with this specification. The final equations
are presented in Table 1.
The equations for Model 2 are in log form. The quarterly change
in price is a function of the quarterly change in price lagged once, of
the four-quarter change in the wage rate lagged once, and of the two-
quarter change in the import price deflator lagged once. The quarterly
change in the wage is a function of the four-quarter change in the price
level lagged once and of the unemployment rate. These equations are con-
sistent with the interpretation of the price equation as a mark up equa-
tion and of the wage equation as the one in which demand effects appear.
The unemployment rate appears in the wage equation but not in the price
equation. It was of the wrong sign and not significant when included in
the price equation (both the current rate and the rate lagged one quarter
were separately tried). The following is a discussion of some of the ex-
perimentation behind the choice of the final equations.
The data seemed to support the use of the four-quarter change in
the wage lagged once in the price equation. When the four one-quarter
changes, log WtJl +d)
—logWti(l +d1)
,I=1,2, 3, 4
were used in place of the four-quarter change, the coefficient estimates
and t-statistlcs were: .139 (2.33), .144 (2.41), .181 (3.00), and .120
(1.97). These coefficients seemed close enough to warrant simply using
the four-quarter change. Neither the one-quarter change unlagged nor the12
one-quarter change lagged five quarters was significant when included with
the other four one-quarter changes. Similarly, the data seemed to support
the use of the two-quarter change in the price of imports lagged once.
When the one-quarter changes lagged once and twice were used in place of
the two-quarter change, the coefficient estimates and t-statistics were:
.0674 (3.20) and .0477 (2.03).
The quarterly change in the wage rate lagged once was not signifi-
cant when added to the wage equation. The t-statistic was only -.49.
The use of the four-quarter change in the price in the wage equation was
supported less than was the use of the four-quarter change in the wage
in the price equation, but the four-quarter change in the price was used
in the wage equation anyway. When the four one-quarter changes were used
in place of the four-quarter change, the coefficient estimates and t-sta-
tistics were: .249 (2.22), .126 (1.07), —.017 (-0.14), and .352 (2.94).
Two sets of estimates of Model 2 are presented in Table 1. The
estimation techniques for the first set are ordinary least squares for the
price equation and 2SLS for the wage equation. The estimation technique
for the second set is 3SLS. There are no endogenous explanatory variables
in the price equation. The unemployment rate in the wage equation was
taken to be an endogenous variable. The two sets of estimates are very
close. The correlation coefficient for the error terms in the two equa-
tionswas only .030, and so very littlewas gained by using 3SLS. Comparing
the single-equation fits with those for Model 1, the price equation has
a larger standard error (.00404 versus .00377) and the wage equation has
a smaller standard error (.00565 versus .00581).13
Model 3
As will be seen in Section V, there is a trade-off between the un-
employment rate and inflation implicit in Model 2. There is, however, a
restriction that can be placed on the coefficients of Model 2 that implies
no long-run trade-off. Model 3 is Model 2 with this restriction imposed.
The restriction is as follows. Let -j =logI_ -log'-i-1 and
=log -logW1 ,i=0,1, ...,4.Writethe price and
wage equations of Model 2 as
(5) =Z + + 2t-lt_2t_3÷wt_4)
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there is no long-run trade-off, and this is the restriction that was imposed
on Model 3.
The estimates with this restriction imposed are presented in Table
1. The equations were estimated by 3SLS, where URt was treated as an14
endogenous variable. The value of the 3SLS objective function was -116.669
for the unrestricted estimates and -128.525 for the restricted estimates,
for a difference of 11.856. Again, this difference is asymptotically dis-
trwbuted as x2 with one degree of freedom. The 11.856 value is consider-
ably above the critical value at the 95 percent confidence level of
3.84, and so the restriction is not supported by the data. The single equa-
tion fits for the price and wage equations are .00415 and .00578 for the
restricted estimates, which compare to .00404 and .00565 for the unrestricted
estimates.
Given the coefficient estimates of Model 3 and given an assumption
about the long-run value of Z ,onecan compute the value of the unem-
ployment rate (say UR* )forwhich inflation neither accelerates nor
decelerates. Under the assumption that the long-run growth rate of d
is zero and that the long-run growth rate of the import price deflator is
7.0 percent at an annual rate, the value of UR* is 6.25 percent. This
value is simply computed by solving the equation 0 =Z+ +
forUR .Thelong-run rate of change of the price level that corresponds
to this value of UR is 3.39 percent at an annual rate. The corresponding
growth rate for the nominal wage is 5.06 percent, and the corresponding
growth rate for the real wage is 1.62 percent.
IV. A Comparison of the Models
Although the single equation fits are available from Table 1, these
fits are not the appropriate criterion for comparing the models. Among
other things, they do not test for the dynamic accuracy of the models and
they do not account in an explicit way for the possible misspecification
of the models. The method in Fair (1980) can be used to compare models,15
and this method is used in this section to compare the three models.
The method accounts for the four main sources of uncertainty of
a forecast: uncertainty due to 1) the error terms, 2) the coefficient
estimates, 3) the exogenous variables, and 4) the possible misspecifica—
tion of the model. Because it accounts for these four sources, it can
be used to make comparisons across models. In other words, it puts each
model on an equal footing for purPoses of comparison. Exogenous variable
uncertainty is not a problem in the present case because each model has
the same exogenous variables, namely d and .Therefore,exog-
enous variable uncertainty has not been taken into account: both d
and PIMt have been assumed to be known with certainty. The following
is a brief outline of the method except for the part pertaining to exog-
enous variable uncertainty.
The Method
Assume that the model has m stochastic equations, p unrestricted
coefficients to estimate, and T observations for the estimation. The
model can be nonlinear, simultaneous, and dynamic. Let S denote the
covariance matrix of the error terms, and let V denote the covariance
matrix of the coefficient estimates. S is mxm and V is pxp .An
estimate of S ,sayS ,is(l/T)U(J' ,whereU is an mxT matrix
of estimated errors. The estimate of V,say ,dependson the esti-
mation techniciiie used. Let &denotea p-component vector of the coef-
ficient estimates, and letu denote an in-component vector of the error
terms for period t
Uncertainty from the error terms and coefficient estimates can be
estimated in a straightforward way by means of stochastic simulation.16
Given assumptions about the distributions of the error terms and coeffi-
cient estimates, one can draw values of both error terms and coefficients.
For each set of values the model can be solved for the period of interest.
Given, say, J trials, the estimated forecast mean and estimated variance
of the forecast error for each endogenous variable for each period can
be computed. Let 7itk denote the estimated mean of the k-period-ahead
forecast of variable i ,wheret is the first Deriod of the forecast,
and let denote the estimated variance of the forecast error.
itk itk
is simply the average of the J predicted values from the J trials, and
°itk is the sum of squared deviationsof the predicted values from the
estimated mean divided by J
It is usually assumed that the distributions of the error terms and
coefficient estimates are normal, although the stochastic-simulation pro-
cedure does not require the normality assumption. The normality assump-
tion has been used for the results in this paper. Let u be a particular
draw of the error terms for period t ,andlet ct be a particular draw
of the coefficients. The distribution of u is assumed to be N(O,S)
and the distribution of cx is assumed to be N(c,V)
Estimating the uncertainty from the possible misspecification of
the model is the most difficult and costly part of the method. It requires
successive reestimation and stochastic simulation of the model. It is
based on a comparison of estimated variances computed by means of stochastic
simulation with estimated variances computed from outside-sample (i.e.,
outside the estimation period) forecast errors. Assuming no stochastic-
simulation error, the expected value of the difference between the two
estimated variances for a given variable and period is zero for a correctly
specified model. The expected value is not in general zero for a misspecified17
model, and this fact is used to try to account for misspecification.
Without going into details, the basic procedure is to estimate the
model over a number of different estimation periods and for each set of
estimates to compute the difference between the two estimated variances
for each variable and length ahead of the forecast. The average of these
differences for each variable and length ahead provides an estimate of the
expected value. Let djk denote this average for variable I and length
ahead k .Givend.,thefinal step is to add it to .This ik itk
sum, which will be denoted ,isthe final estimated variance.
Another way of looking at dik is that it is the part of the forecast-
error variance not accounted for by the stochastic-simulation estimate.6
The Results
Table 2 contains the results. The values in the a rows are sto-
chastic-simulation estimates of the forecast standard errors based on
draws of error terms only. The values in the b rows are based on draws
of both error terms and coefficients. The results are based on 500 trials
for each of the two stochastic simulations.7 The simulation period is
1982 II -1984I. In terms of the above notation, the b-row values are
6Strictly speaking, ik is not a measure of the misspecification of the
model (for the k-period-ahead forecast of variable i ).Misspecification
can affect the stochastic simulation estimate of the variance
and d.k is merely the effect of misspecification on the total variance
not reflected in °itk For purposes of comparing the models, it does
not matter how much of the misspecification is in .Thevariance
that is used for comparison is the total variance, tk
7The 3SLS estimates of each model were used for these simulations, includ-
ing the 3SLS estimates of S and V .Theerrors in Table 2 are in units
of percent of the forecast mean. See the discussion in Chapter 8 in Fair
(1984) for the exact way in which the percentage errors are computed.TABLE 2. Estimated standard errors of forecasts for 1982 II -1984I
for the three models
18
Notes: a =Uncertaintydue to error terms.
b =Uncertaintydue to errorterms and coefficient estimates.
d =Uncertaintydue to error terms, coefficient estimates, and the
possible misspecification of the model.

























































































































































































































































values of .Eachmodel consists of three equations: the price equa-
tion, the wage equation, and an identity determining the real wage (W/P)
For the misspecification results each model was estimated and sto-
chastically simulated 37 times.8 For the first set, the estimation period
ended in 1974 IV and the simulation period began in 1975 I. For the second
set, the estimation period ended in 1975 I and the simulation period began
in 1975 II. For the final set, the estimation period ended in 1983 IV
and the simulation period began in 1984 I. The beginning quarter was 1954 I
for all estimation periods. The length of the first 30 simulation periods
was eight quarters. Since the data set ended in 1984 I, the length of the
31st simulation period, which began in 1982 III, was only seven quarters.
Similarly, the length of the 32nd period was six, and so on through the
length of the 37th period, which was only one quarter. For each of the
37 sets of estimates, new estimates of V and S were obtained. Each of
the 37 stochastic simulations was based on 200 trials.
The results produced for the one-quarter-ahead forecast for each
of the three endogenous variables 37 values of the difference between the
estimated forecast-error variance based on outside-sample errors (i.e.,
the squared forecast errors) and the estimated forecast-error variance
based on stochastic simulation. The average of these 37 values was taken
for each variable. In terms of the above notation, this average is d.1
where the i refers to variable i and the I refers to the one-quarter-
8Because the OLS-2SLS and 3SLS estimates of Model 2 were so close for the
results in Table 2, the OLS-2SLS techniques were used for the successive
reestimation for Model 2.Estimating a model 37 times by 3SLS is expensive,
and for Model 2 it seemed unnecessary to do this. The estimate of V for
the OLS-2SLS techniques was assumed to be block diagonal for purposes of
the stochastic simulation draws. Both Models 1 and 3 were estimated 37
times by 3SLS.20
ahead forecast. The total variance for the one-quarter-ahead forecast
of variable j is + ,whichin terms of the above notation
iti ii
is .Forthe results in Table 2, t is 1982 II, and the d-row value
for 1982 II for each variable is the square root of .Thecalcula-
tions for the two-quarter-ahead forecasts are the same except that there
areonly 36 values of the difference between the two estimated variances
for each variable. Similarly, there are only 35 values for the three-
quarter-aheadforecast, and so on.
The d-row values in Table 2 can be compared across models. For
both the price level and the nominal wage, Model 1 is the clear winner.
It has the lowest standard errors for all the periods except for the one-
quarter-ahead forecast of the price level, where the standard error is
.50 for Model 1 and .49 for Model 3. By the end of the eight quarter hori-
zon, the differences in the standard errors are fairly large. For the
price level the eighth quarter standard errors are 2.94 for Model 1, 4.51
for Model 2, and 3.67 for Model 3. For the nominal wage the errors are
2.10 for Model 1, 2,95 for Model 2, and 3.28 for Model 3. With respect
to Model 2 versus Model 3, Model 3 does better for prices and Model 2 does
better for wages.
The results for the real wage are closer. Model 1 is the best for
the first six quarters; the models essentially tie for the seventh quarter;
and Models 2 and 3 are better than Model 1 for the eighth quarter. In
general the results are fairly close, and there is no clear cut winner,21
V. Properties of the Models
Unemployment-Inflation Trade-offs
For each model it is straightforward to compute the trade-off be-
tween the unemployment rate and inflation. A simulation is first run using
a particular value of the unemployment rate, and then another simulation
is run using another value. The differences in the predicted values from
the two simulations are the estimated trade-offs. The results of this
exercise are presented in Table 3. The first simulation for each model
began in 1984 II, which means that the initial conditions through 1984 I
were used. The simulation was allowed to run for 140 quarters. An unem-
ployment rate of 7.8 percent was used for all future periods. The annual
rate of growth of the import price deflator was taken to be 7.0 percent.
The rate of growth of the employer social security tax rate (dt) was
taken to be zero throughout the period. The second simulation for each
model differed from the first only in the unemployment rate that was used.
The unemployment was lowered to 6.8 percent for all future periods for this
simulation. The results in Table 3 are the differences between the two
simulations.
As can be seen, the models have quite different long—run properties.
For Model 1 the one percentage point drop in the unemployment rate leads
to an eventual rise in the price level of 5.15 percent and in the wage
level of 4.81 percent. The real wage falls slightly (by .32 percent).
At the end of the first year the price level is .60 percent higher; at
the end of the second year it is 1.30 percent higher; and at the end of
the fourth year it is 2.38 percent higher, which is about half way to the
final increase of 5.15 percent. Not counting the first quarter, the in-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quarter, to .80 in the fourth quarter, to .68 in the eighth quarter, to
.48 in the sixteenth quarter, and to zero after 140 quarters. A similar
pattern holds for the nominal wage.
For Model 2 the one percentage point drop in the unemployment rate
leads to an eventual increase in the rate of change of the price level of
.95 percent. The eventual increase in the rate of change of the nominal
wage is 1.16 percent, and the eventual increase in the rate of change of
the real wage is .19 percent. The price and wage levels are, of course,
ever increasing. After 140 quarters the price level is 34.74 percent higher,
the nominal wage is 44.35 percent higher, and the real wage is 7.14 per—
cent higher. At somewhere between 30 and 40 quarters the price level be-
comes 5.15 percent higher, which is the long—run total for Model 1.
It is interesting to compare the first few quarters for Models 1
and 2. The rate of inflation is initially much larger for Model 1 than
for Model 2. After eight quarters the price level is 1.30 percent higher
for Model 1 compared to .53 percent higher for Model 2. The rate of in-
flation for Model 1 falls from .88 in the second quarter to .68 in the
eighth quarter. For Model 2 the rate of inflation rises from .07 in the
second quarter to .48 in the eighth quarter. There is thus much more of
a short run trade-off for Model 1 than for Model 2. The rates of inflation
cross at quarter 11, where they are .60 for Model 1 and .61 for Model 2.
After quarter 11 the rate of inflation rises to .95 for Model 2 and falls
to zero for Model 1. The price levels cross somewhere between quarters
20 and 30.
Consider now the results for Model 3. The unemployment rates of
6.8 and 7.8 percent are above the non decelerating rate of 6.25, and so
for both simulations the rate of inflation is decelerating. Although not24
shown in Table 3, the rate of inflation becomes negative in quarter 18
for the simulation in which the unemployment rate is 7.8 percent. By
quarter 140 the rate of inflation is -20.96 percent. The differences in
Table 3 for Model 3 are thus differences between two decelerating paths.
It is interesting to note that the differences for the first few quarters
for Model 3 are not all that different from the differences for Model 2,
although they are somewhat higher for Model 3.
Effects of a Change in Import Prices
One can also examine how the models respond to a change in import
prices. Again, two simulations can be run, one using one set of values
for future import prices and one using another. The results of this exer-
cise are presented in Table 4. The first simulation used an annual rate
of change of import prices of 7.0 percent, and the second used a rate of
8.0 percent. The initial conditions were the same as those for the simu-
lations in Table 3. An unemployment rate of 7.8 percent was used for these
results.
The increase in the rate of change of import prices led to an in-
crease in the rate of change of prices and wages for both Models 1 and 2.
For prices the long—run effect is .69 for Model 1 and .38 for Model 2.
For wages the two numbers are .43 and .27. The long—run rate of change
in the real wage fell in both cases. The fall was larger for Model 1 than
for Model 2 (-.25versus -.11). Although the long—run properties differ
somewhat, the short—run properties of the two models are quite close, as
can be seen from examining, say, the first eight quarters in Table 3.
The short—run results for Model 3 are also fairly close to those for Models






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The two key questions regarding the long-run trade-off between un-
employment and inflation are 1) whether there is any trade-off and 2) if
there is one, whether it is in terms of the level of prices or the rate
of change of prices. The results of comparing the three models in Section
IV indicate that Model 1 is more accurate than Models 2 and 3, and so from
these results one would conclude that there is a trade-off and that it
is in terms of the level of prices. If the choice is merely between Models
2 and 3, the results are inconclusive.9
Although Model 1 does seem to be the best approximation of the three,
the results must be interpreted with considerable caution. As noted in
Section II, macro data have a difficult time discriminating among alterna-
tive lag distributions, and alternative lag distributions can have large
effects on the long-run properties of a model. One should clearly put
much less weight on the long-run properties of the models than on the short-
run properties (say, up to eight or twelve quarters ahead),
One may at first be surprised to think that the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation may be in terms of the level of prices rather
than the rate of change, but there is no theoretically compelling reason
to rule out the level trade-off without testing the two possibilities.
As noted in Section III, it seems natural, given my theoretical model, to
91n future work it may be possible to provide a better test of Model 2
versus Model 3. The comparisons in Section IV were only for forecasts
up to eight quarters ahead. It can be seen from Table 3 that the main
differences between the two models occur after eight quarters. It may
thus be possible to get more conclusive results by using a forecast hori-
zon longer than eight quarters. No attempt was made to do this in this
study.27
specify the price and wage equations in level terms. In general, there
seems no reason to expect that a permanent shift in demand will neces-
sarily lead to a permanently higher rate of change of prices and thus to
an ever increasing price level. At the least, this issue seems open to
empirical test, and the tests in this paper provide support for the prop-
osition that the trade-off is in terms of levels.
Another point that should be kept in mind about Model 1 is the
following. One might argue (I think correctly) that it is not sensible
to expect that the unemployment rate could be driven to, say, 1.0 percent
without having any more effect on prices than on their levels. (The same
argument could even be made for Model 2 regarding the rates of change of
prices.) There are clearly unemployment rates below which it is not sen-
sible to assume that any of the three models provides a good approximation.
Any attempt to extrapolate a model beyond the extremes of the data is
dangerous, and this seems particularly true in the case of price and wage
equations.
I sometimes try to account for the nonlinearities in price responses
that one expects to exist as the unemployment rate approaches very low
levels by using as the demand variable in the price and wage equations
some function of the unemployment rate (or other measure of demand). These
functions approach infinity or minus infinity as the unemployment rate
approaches some small value. This means that as the unemyloyment rate
approaches this value, prices approach infinity. In a complete model of
the economy, prices can never be driven to infinity, and so this approach
effectively bounds the unemployment rate from below. The problem with
this approach is that the data generally cannot discriminate among altern-
ative functional forms, and so any choice is somewhat arbitrary. The2
approach that I have taken in this paper is to keep the specification simpi)
bymerely using the level of the unemployment rate as an explanatory var-
iable. The consequence of this is that one should not extrapolate the
equations much beyond the range of the historical data.
Real Wage Responses
The experiments in Tables 3 and 4 have consequences for the long-
runleveland rate of change of the real wage. Some of the long-run real
wage properties of the models may not be reasonable. To see tillS,con-
sider a variable, denoted SHRII ,whichis defined to be the ratio of
after tax profits of the firm sector to the wage bill of the firm sector
net of employer social security taxes.'° The mean of this variable for
the 1954 I -1984I period is .109, with a maximum value of .136 in 1979 III
and a minimum value of .066 in 1983 I. The variable has essentially no
trend throughout this period. A regression of SHIfl on a constant term
and time trend for this period yields a coefficient estimate of the time
trend of -.000084,with a t-statistic of -1.91. This coefficient multi-
plied by 121, the number of observations, yields -.010, which is the esti-
mated trend change in SHRITI This is a fairly small change over the 30
year period.
A fall in the level of the real wage of one percent leads to a rise
in SURF of approximately .0075. If a given experiment with the price
and wage equations results in a large change in the long-run level of the
real wage, this may imply values of SHRF that are considerably beyond
the historical range. If so, this may call into question the long-run
properties, since there may be forces at work (not captured by the
10SHRII is a variable in my U.S. model. See Fair (1984) for the precise
definition of it.29
equations) keeping SHRII at roughly a constant level in the long run.
The unemployment rate experiments in Table 3 show that Model 1 is fine
in this regard (the long-run level of the real wage changes very little),
but that Model 2 is not. The results for Model 2 show that the level of
the real wage is ever increasing, although at a fairly slow rate. After
140 quarters the level of the real wage is 7.14 percent higher, which
implies a fall in SHRTI of approximately .00757.14 =.054.This is
about five times larger than the trend change over the 121 quarters be-
tween 1954 I and 1984 I.
The import price experiments in Table 4 show that both Models 1
and 2 have ever changing real wage levels, in this case ever falling real
wage levels. The fall is larger for Model 1 than for Model 2.I think
the problem here is the following. Over the sample period there has been
a certain trend change in the price of imports. The coefficient estimates
of the price and wage equations are based on this trend. In the case of
Model 1 the key coefficient estimate is the estimate of the time trend
in the wage equation. Given that the coefficients estimates are based
on this trend, it is not necessarily sensible to run an experiment in which
the rate of change of the price of imports is permanently changed without
also changing the coefficient estimate of the time trend in the wage equa-
tion to adjust for this trend change. A similar adjustment should be made
to one or both of the constant terms in Model 2. With these adjustments,
the models would still show an increase in the rate of changes of prices
and wages in response to the increase in the rate of change of the price
of imports, but the coefficient adjustments could be made to show no change
in the real wage in the long run.30
Policy Options
There is little more to be said about policy options that is not
obvious from the results in Table 3. If one believes that Model 1 is the
best approximation, the trade-offs can be read from the results for Model
1. The cost of a fall in the unemployment rate of one percentage point
is an increase in the price level of 1.30 percent after 8 quarters. If
Model 2 is chosen, the cost is an increase of .53 percent after 8 quarters.
If one's horizon is 20 quarters, the estimated cost is about the same for
both models: 2.80 percent for Model 1 and 2.57 percent for Model 2. After
20 quarters the estimated costs from the two models diverge rapidly, and
this is where the most uncertainty lies. For Model 1 there is an increase
in the price level of 5.15 -2.60=2.55percent left. For Model 2 there
is an increase in the rate of change of prices of .95 -.81=.14left.
Consequences for Macroeconomic Research
One of the important results of this paper is that the no long-run
trade-off model, Model 3, does not appear to be as good an approximation
to the economy as does Model 1. The comparison with Model 2 is inconclu-
sive, although it is certainly not the case that Model 3 dominates 'Iode1 2.
This result has important consequences for macroeconomic research. Eco-
nomists with such diverse views as Tobin and Lucas seem to agree with the
Friedman—Phelps proposition that there is no long-run trade-off between
unemployment and inflation. (See Tobin (1980), p. 39, and Lucas (1981),
p. 560.) Lucas (1981) points out in his review of Tobin's (1980) book
that most of the recent developments in macroeconomic theory have been
motivated by the problem of reconciling the natural rate hypothesis of
Friedman and Phelps with an adequate treatment of output and employment31
fluctuations.I think Lucas is right in arguing that Tobin cannot accept
the proposition of no long-run trade-off and at the same time accept short-
run propositions that do not imply the Friedman-Phelps proposition in the
long run. The long run is simply a sequence of short runs.
Where I think both Tobin and Lucas have missed the mark is in so
readily accepting the Friedman-Phelps proposition. The evidence in this
paper suggests that this proposition may not be true, and at the least
the validity of the proposition is highly uncertain. It seems unwise to
me to have based more than a decade of macroeconomic research on such a
proposition. The present results suggest that more thought should be given
to the possibility that the concept of a natural rate of unemployment is
not a useful one upon which to base a theory)1
theory upon which my macroeconometric model is based does not use
the concept of a natural rate of unemployment. See Fair (1984), in par-
ticular pages 15-16 and 90-91.32
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